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PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
__________ 
 
Nos. 14-3956, 14-3957, 14-3958, 14-4278, 14-4279, 14-4422 
__________ 
 
NEW YORK SHIPPING ASSOCIATION INC, on behalf of 
its members; METROPOLITAN MARINE 
MAINTENANCE CONTRACTORS’ ASSOCIATION, INC., 
on behalf of its members; INTERNATIONAL 
LONGSHOREMEN’S ASSOCIATION AFL-CIO, on behalf 
of its members and affiliated locals in the Port of New York 
and New Jersey; LOCAL 1804-1, INTERNATIONAL 
LONGSHOREMENS ASSOCIATION, AFL-CIO; LOCAL 
1814, INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN’S 
ASSOCIATION, AFL-CIO, on behalf of its members 
 
 v. 
 
WATERFRONT COMMISSION OF  
NEW YORK HARBOR 
 
 New York Shipping Association Inc., 
                                                       Appellant in 14-3956 
____ 
 
 
NEW YORK SHIPPING ASSOCIATION INC, on behalf of 
its members; METROPOLITAN MARINE 
MAINTENANCE CONTRACTORS ASSOCIATION, INC. 
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on behalf of its members; INTERNATIONAL 
LONGSHOREMENS ASSOCIATION AFL-CIO, 
On behalf of its members and affilated locals in the Port of 
New York and New Jersey;  LOCAL 1804-1, 
INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN'S ASSOCIATION, 
AFL-CIO;LOCAL 1814, INTERNATIONAL 
LONGSHOREMEN'S ASSOCIATION, AFL-CIO 
 
 v. 
 
WATERFRONT COMMISSION OF  
NEW YORK HARBOR 
 
International Longshoremen’s Association, AFL-CIO, 
Local 1804-1, International Longshoremen’s Association, 
AFL-CIO, Local 1814, International  
Longshoremen's Association, AFL-CIO, 
                                                            Appellants in 14-3957 
____ 
 
NEW YORK SHIPPING ASSOCIATION INC, on behalf of 
its members; METROPOLITAN MARINE 
MAINTENANCE CONTRACTORS’ ASSOCIATION, on 
behalf of its members; INTERNATIONAL 
LONGSHOREMENS ASSOCIATION AFL-CIO, on behalf 
of its members and affiliated locals in the Port of New York 
and New Jersey; LOCAL 1804-1, INTERNATIONAL 
LONGSHOREMEN’S ASSOCIATION, AFL-CIO; LOCAL 
1814, INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN’S 
ASSOCIATION, AFL-CIO, on behalf of its members 
 
 v. 
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WATERFRONT COMMISSION OF  
NEW YORK HARBOR 
 
Metropolitan Marine Maintenance Contractors'  
Association, Inc.,  
                                                              Appellant in 14-3958 
____ 
 
NEW YORK SHIPPING ASSOCIATION INC, on behalf of 
its members; METROPOLITAN MARINE 
MAINTENANCE CONTRACTORS ASSOCIATION,  
on behalf of its members; INTERNATIONAL 
LONGSHOREMENS ASSOCIATION AFL-CIO,  
on behalf of its members;  INTERNATIONAL 
LONGSHOREMENS ASSOCIATION LOCAL 1804-1,  
on behalf of its members; INTERNATIONAL 
LONGSHOREMENS ASSOCIATION 1814,  
on behalf of its members  
v. 
 
 WATERFRONT COMMISSION OF  
NEW YORK HARBOR 
 
 New York Shipping Association, Inc., 
                                                                Appellant in 14-4278 
____ 
 
NEW YORK SHIPPING ASSOCIATION INC,  
on behalf of its members; METROPOLITAN MARINE 
MAINTENANCE CONTRACTORS ASSOCIATION,  
on behalf of its members;INTERNATIONAL 
LONGSHOREMENS ASSOCIATION 1814, 
on behalf of its members; 
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INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMENS ASSOCIATION 
LOCAL 1804-1, on behalf of its members; 
INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMENS ASSOCIATION 
AFL-CIO, on behalf of its members 
 
v. 
 
WATERFRONT COMMISSION OF  
NEW YORK HARBOR 
 
International Longshoremen’s Association, AFL-CIO; 
 International Longshoremen’s Association 1814,  
International Longshoremen's Association 1804-1; 
                                                              Appellants in 14-4279 
____ 
 
 
NEW YORK SHIPPING ASSOCIATION INC, on behalf of 
its members; INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMENS 
ASSOCIATION 1814, on behalf of its members;  
INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMENS ASSOCIATION 
AFL-CIO, on behalf of its members;  
INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMENS ASSOCIATION 
LOCAL 1804-1, on behalf of its members;  
METROPOLITAN MARINE MAINTENANCE 
CONTRACTORS ASSOCIATION, on behalf of its members 
 
 v. 
 
WATERFRONT COMMISSION OF  
NEW YORK HARBOR 
 
 Metropolitan Marine Maintenance  
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Contractors Association Inc., 
                                                  Appellant in 14-4422 
__________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
 
(D.C. Civil No. 2-13-cv-07115) 
District Judge:  Honorable Susan D. Wigenton 
 
ARGUED JULY 9, 2015 
 
BEFORE:  FUENTES, NYGAARD,  
and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
 
(Filed: August 30, 2016) 
 
James R. Campbell, Jr., Esq. 
Donato Caruso, Esq. [Argued] 
The Lambos Firm 
303 South Broadway, Suite 410 
Tarrytown, NY  10591 
 Counsel for Appellant New York 
 Shipping Association, Inc. 
 
Kevin J. Marrinan, Esq. [Argued] 
John P. Sheridan, Esq. 
Marrinan & Mazzola Mardon 
26 Broadway, 17th Floor 
New York, NY  10004  
 Counsel for Appellants International  
 Longshoremen’s Association AFL-CIO, International 
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  Longshoremen’s Association AFL-CIO Local1804-1, 
 and International Longshoremen’s Association AFL- 
 CIO Local 1814 
 
Peter O. Hughes, Esq. [Argued] 
Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart 
10 Madison Avenue, Suite 400 
Morristown, NJ  07960 
 Counsel for Appellant Metropolitan Marine 
 Maintenance Contractors Association 
 
Phoebe S. Sorial, Esq. [Argued] 
Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor 
39 Broadway, 4th Floor 
New York, NY  10006 
 Counsel for Appellee Waterfront Commission of New 
 York Harbor 
__________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________ 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
 The District Court ruled that the Appellee, Waterfront 
Commission of New York Harbor (Commission or 
Waterfront Commission),1 was within its statutory authority 
                                              
1 Appellee Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor is a 
bi-state corporate and political entity created by interstate 
compact.  N.J.S.A. § 32:23-1; N.Y. Unconsol. Laws § 9801 
(McKinney).  All statutory citations to the Compact 
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to require shipping companies and other employers to certify 
that prospective employees had been referred for employment 
pursuant to federal and state nondiscrimination policies.  The 
District Court also rejected claims that the Commission had 
unlawfully interfered with collective bargaining rights, 
holding that such rights were not completely protected under 
the language of the Waterfront Commission Compact 
(Compact), which was entered into by the states of New 
Jersey and New York in 1953.  We will affirm. 
 
I. 
Factual and Procedural Background 
 This appeal takes us deep into the hiring practices and 
procedures utilized on the New York/New Jersey waterfront.  
We will start with some history, which to varying degrees, 
has been reported elsewhere.  See, e.g., De Veau v. Braisted, 
363 U.S. 144 (1960); Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor v. 
Sea Land Serv., Inc., 764 F.2d 961 (3d Cir. 1985); Hazleton v. 
Murray, 21 N.J. 115 (1956); Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. 
Harbor v. Constr. & Marine Equip. Co., Inc., 928 F. Supp. 
1388 (D.N.J. 1996).  Years of criminal activity and corrupt 
hiring practices on the waterfront were first brought to light in 
1949 in a series of 24 articles published in the New York Sun 
by journalist Malcolm Johnson.  Entitled “Crime on the 
Waterfront,” these articles won Johnson the Pulitzer Prize, 
and formed the basis for the 1954 film “On the Waterfront.”2 
                                                                                                     
provisions will be to the New Jersey statute, unless otherwise 
noted. 
2 For detailed historical information on the New York 
waterfront and its association with criminal activity, see 
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 Hiring practices on the waterfront also caught the 
attention of the New York State Crime Commission (Crime 
Commission), which issued a report in 1953 relating in detail 
the pervasive influence of crime and corruption on waterfront 
hiring practices.  See Fourth Report of the New York State 
Crime Commission, N.Y.S. Leg. Doc. No. 70 (1953).  The 
Crime Commission singled-out the “shape-up” hiring system 
for particular scorn.  The term connotes a hiring method 
whereby the applicants appeared daily at the docks or other 
locations and a hiring boss would select those who would be 
given work.  Id. at 37.3  The foundation of this practice was 
the union foreman’s unfettered control over the process and 
his unchecked power to select whomever he desired for 
employment.   
 
 The Crime Commission report led to public hearings 
on its findings.  Then-New York Governor Thomas E. Dewey 
held hearings, the goal of which was to come up with a 
legislative plan to address the Commission’s concerns.  
Representatives of the State of New Jersey were also present 
for and participated in these hearings.  The “shape-up” hiring 
system was identified by the Commission as a vector for 
corruption and criminal practices on the docks.  So as “to 
investigate, deter, combat and remedy” this criminality and 
corruption, the states of New Jersey and New York entered 
into the Compact in 1953.  Gonzalez v. Waterfront Comm’n 
                                                                                                     
Nathan Ward, Dark Harbor: The War for the New York 
Waterfront (2010); see also Jonathan Eig, ‘Waterfront’ 
Jungle,  N. Y. Times, Sept. 24, 2010. 
3 See also Levias v. Pac. Maritime Ass’n, 760 F. Supp. 2d 
1036, 1050 (W.D. Wash. 2001). 
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of N.Y. Harbor, 755 F.3d 176, 177 (3d Cir. 2014); see also 
N.J.S.A. § 32:23-1, et seq.  Pursuant to Art. I., § 10 of the 
United States Constitution, Congress approved the Compact 
in August of 1953.4  The Compact created the Waterfront 
Commission to, among other things, eliminate corrupt hiring 
practices on the waterfront.  Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. v. 
Elizabeth-Newark Shipping Inc., 164 F.3d 177, 180 (3d Cir. 
1980) (citing Hazelton, 21 N.J. at 120-23).  In enacting the 
Compact, the legislatures of both states noted: 
 
that the conditions under which 
waterfront labor is employed with 
the Port of New York district are 
depressing and degrading to such 
labor, resulting from the lack of 
any systemic method of hiring, 
the lack of adequate information 
as to the availability of 
employment, corrupt hiring 
practices, and the fact that persons 
conducting such hiring are 
frequently criminals and persons 
notoriously lacking in moral 
                                              
4 The Compact Clause of the Constitution provides that “[n]o 
State shall, without the Consent of Congress, . . . enter into 
any Agreement or Compact with another State.”  Art. I, § 10, 
cl. 3.  Accordingly, before a compact between two States can 
be given effect it must be approved by Congress.  See 
Virginia v. Maryland, 540 U.S. 56, 66 (2003).  Once a 
Compact receives such approval, it is “transform[ed] . . . into 
a law of the United States.”  Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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character and integrity and neither 
responsive or responsible to the 
employers nor to the uncoerced 
will of the majority members of 
the labor organizations of the 
employees; that as a result 
waterfront laborers suffer from 
irregularity of employment, fear 
and insecurity, inadequate 
earnings, an unduly high accident 
rate, subjection to borrowing at 
usurious rates of interest, 
exploitation and extortion as the 
price of securing employment. 
 
N.J.S.A. § 32:23-2.   
 One way the Compact sought to rein in the corruption 
associated with hiring on the waterfront was by requiring the 
Commission to regulate longshoremen and stevedores.  
Employment Information Centers were to be operated by the 
Commission to handle all hiring of longshoremen.  Further, 
the Compact charged the Commission with registering all 
individuals who were qualified to work as longshoremen and 
specifically provided that “no person shall act as a 
longshoreman within the Port of New York district unless at 
the time he is included in the longshoremen’s register.”  
N.J.S.A. § 32:23-27.   The Compact also provided a definition 
of a longshoreman: 
 
[A] natural person, other than the 
hiring agent, who is employed for 
work at a pier or other waterfront 
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terminal, either by a carrier of 
freight by water or by a stevedore 
(a) physically to move waterborne 
freight on vessels berthed at piers, 
on piers or at other waterfront 
terminals, or (b) to engage in 
direct and immediate checking of 
any such freight or of the 
custodial accounting therefore, or 
in the recording or tabulation of 
the hours worked at piers or other 
waterfront terminals by natural 
persons employed by carriers of 
freight by water or stevedores, or 
(c) to supervise directly and 
immediately others who are 
employed as in subdivision (a) of 
this definition. 
 
N.J.S.A. § 32:23-6.  This definition was expanded in 1957 to 
include workers who performed labor that was incidental to 
the movement of waterborne freight.  N.J.S.A. § 32:23-85(6).  
A longshoreman who fits either the original or expanded 
definition was known as a “deep sea” longshoreman.5  
Further, the Compact gave the Commission the authority to 
license stevedoring companies that wanted to operate at the 
Port.  A ‘stevedore,’ according to the Compact, is a contractor 
                                              
5 These longshoremen are sometimes referred to as “five-
digit” longshoremen in light of the five digit registration 
number assigned them by the Commission.  See Bozzi v. 
Waterfront Comm’n of N. Y. Harbor, No. 90-cv-0926 (MGC), 
1994 WL 606043 at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 1994).   
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hired by a carrier of waterborne freight to move freight in 
ships that are berthed at piers, or at other waterfront 
terminals.  See N.J.S.A. § 32:23-6. 
 
 By 1969, new developments in shipping technology 
required changes to hiring procedures on the waterfront.  The 
New Jersey Supreme Court has summarized this new 
technology: 
 
Containerization involves the 
loading of cargo by a shipper into 
a box-like object called a 
container.  The cargo-laden 
container is loaded onto a truck 
frame that transports it to a pier 
where it is hoisted aboard a ship 
designed to carry containers.  At 
the port of discharge, the process 
is simply reversed.  
Containerization contrasts sharply 
with the traditional “break-bulk” 
shipping method, which involved 
loading trucks item by item, 
emptying them piece by piece at 
the pier, and then loading the ship 
in the same fashion. 
 
Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 
99 N.J. 402, 411-12 (1985).  Containerization and other new 
technologies dramatically decreased the need for manual 
labor at the port.  This decrease in the size of the labor force 
led, in turn, to the enactment of an amendment to the 
Compact: Section 5-p.  Known as the “closed register 
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statute,” Section 5-p authorized the Commission to open or 
close the Longshoreman’s Register so as to balance the 
workforce with the demand for labor.  See, e.g., Nat’l Org. of 
Women, N.Y. Chapter v. Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor, 
468 F. Supp. 317, 319 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); see also N.J.S.A. § 
32:23-114.  The prevalence of containerization in the 
shipping industry also led to the creation of a new class of 
dock worker: longshoremen who did not load or unload ships, 
but instead performed services that were incidental to those 
tasks.  This new class of longshoremen were registered with 
the Commission and commonly referred to as “A-registrants,” 
to distinguish them from deep sea longshoremen.6  A-
registrants were not permitted to do any work that involved 
the discharge or unloading of cargo vessels.  New 
classifications of stevedores were also created to cover those 
contactors that were involved in the loading and unloading of 
the containers, cargo storage, cargo repairing, coopering, 
general maintenance and other miscellaneous work.  
 
 The Commission codified these worker classifications 
in Section 4.4 of its Rules and Regulations.  Section 4.4 
divided the Longshoreman’s Register into two sections, 
reflecting these two classifications of labor: 
 
(b)  The register shall be divided 
as follows:  (1) A “deep sea” 
register which shall include all 
persons registered by the 
                                              
6 The “A” classification comes from the “A” prefix attached 
before these worker’s multi-digit registration number, which 
appear on licenses issued by the Commission to those 
workers.  See Bozzi, 1994 WL 606043 at *3. 
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commission as longshoremen and 
checkers except those persons 
registered as longshoremen 
pursuant to the 1969 amendments 
to the Act (NY Laws 1969, ch. 
953; NJ Laws 1969, ch. 128); (2) 
An “A” or “1969 amendment” 
register which shall include all 
persons registered by the 
commission as longshoremen 
pursuant to the 1969 amendments 
to the act (NY Laws 1969, ch. 
953; NJ Laws 1969, ch. 128). 
 
N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. Tit. 21 § 4.4 (2013).  This 
resulted in the bifurcation of the labor force:  members of the 
New York Shipping Association (NYSA) represented the 
deep sea registrants while Metropolitan Marine Maintenance 
Contractor’s Association (MMMCA) members employed the 
A-registrants.  In the 1980s, the Commission clarified the 
status of these two workforces as they related to the closed 
register.  Section 5-p was amended to now provide that 
“[n]otwithstanding any other provision of this act, the 
commission may include [A-registrants] in the 
longshoremen’s register under such terms and conditions as 
the commission may prescribe.”  N.J.S.A. § 32:23-114(4). 
 
 Section 5-p was again amended in 1999.  Increased 
business in the port and attrition in the labor force, among 
other things, necessitated changes to the procedures that had 
previously been used to open the longshoreman’s register.  
Public hearings were held in which the Commission and 
15 
 
several of the Appellants participated.  As amended, Section 
5-p required that  
 
[t]he sponsoring employer shall 
certify that the selection of the 
persons so sponsored was made 
on a fair and non-discriminatory 
basis in accordance with the 
requirements of the laws of the 
United States and the States of 
New York and New Jersey 
dealing with equal employment 
opportunities. 
 
N.J.S.A. § 32:23-114(1).    
 The dispute before us today arose from the 
Commission’s decision to open the longshoremen’s register 
in December of 2013.  The NYSA, an organization 
representing marine terminal operators, stevedoring 
companies and ship operators in the Port of New York and 
New Jersey, along with the MMMCA, and the International 
Longshoremen’s Association, AFL-CIO (ILA), filed a 
complaint against the Commission in November of 2013.7  
The NYSA and the ILA had, three months earlier, asked the 
                                              
7 The MMMCA represents maintenance contractor employers 
and the ILA represents longshoremen and other waterfront 
workers employed by the NYSA’s members.  Also parties to 
this dispute are two local chapters of the ILA—Local 1804-1 
and Local 1814.  Where appropriate, we will refer to all 
Appellants collectively. 
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Commission to add, on its own initiative, more than 600 
employees to the deep sea register.  The NYSA and the ILA 
also told the Commission that they would recruit, train, and 
hire individuals pursuant to the terms of the Recruitment and 
Hiring Plan, which was agreed to under a new collective 
bargaining agreement between the NYSA and the ILA.8  
After meeting with representatives of the NYSA, MMMCA 
and others, the Commission issued Determination 35 in 
December of 2013 which, among other things, stated that the 
Commission would open the Register to accept applications 
for 225 new positions.  The Commission’s Determination also 
required: 
. . . that prior to the Commission’s 
acceptance of any application for 
inclusion in the Longshoremen's 
Register pursuant to this 
Determination, a representative of 
the NYSA–ILA Contract Board 
directly involved with the 
administration of the Hiring Plan 
shall submit a letter setting forth 
the name and address of the 
recommended individual, and 
certifying that:  
 
(1) he or she has personal 
knowledge of the facts 
concerning the recruitment, 
                                              
8 Under this plan, 51% of new hires were to consist of 
honorably discharged military veterans, 25% of new hires 
would be referrals from the ILA and 24% would be referrals 
from the NYSA. 
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referral, selection and 
sponsorship of [the 
applicant] and (2) the 
selection of the person so 
sponsored was made in a 
fair and nondiscriminatory 
basis in accordance with 
the requirements of the 
laws of the United States 
and the States of New 
York and New Jersey 
dealing with equal 
employment opportunities. 
 
Commission Determination 35 (Dec. 3, 2013).9   
 The Appellants sued the Commission in November of 
2014.  They asked for declaratory and injunctive relief 
pursuant to the Declaratory Judgments Act, 28 U.S.C.A.  §§ 
2201-2202 (2006).  They also asked the District Court for a 
preliminary injunction prohibiting the Commission from 
implementing its antidiscrimination certification 
requirements.  The District Court denied the request for a 
preliminary injunction, finding that the Appellants failed to 
show irreparable harm and a likelihood of success on the 
merits.  The Commission then filed a motion to dismiss.  
Appellants amended their complaint in January of 2015, 
which the District Court ultimately dismissed.  Appellants 
have timely appealed that dismissal. 
                                              
9 A copy of Determination 35 is available at 
http://www.waterfrontcommission.org/news/determination35.
pdf 
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III. 
 We have jurisdiction to review the District Court’s 
October 9, 2014 order dismissing the Appellants’ amended 
complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary 
review of an order granting a motion to dismiss under Rule 
12(b)(6) and apply the same standard as the District Court.  
Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 206 (3d Cir. 
2009).  “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must 
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 
 
IV. 
 Appellants NYSA, ILA and the ILA Locals filed a 
joint brief while Appellant MMMCA opted to brief us 
separately.  Appellants collectively question the validity of 
the antidiscrimination certification procedure added to 
Section 5-p in 1999, and, by extension, Rule 4.4.  They also 
claim that they have successfully pleaded the Commission’s 
unlawful interference with their collective bargaining rights.  
The NYSA, ILA and ILA Locals further claim that the 
Commission violated their due process rights in promulgating 
its certification amendment in Rule 4.4.  For organizational 
purposes, we will address these issues with reference to the 
specific counts of the Amended Complaint in which they 
were raised. 
A. 
Dismissal of Counts I and II 
19 
 
 The Compact permits “amendments and supplements” 
as long as those changes implement the Compact’s purposes 
and are concurred in by the legislatures of New Jersey and 
New York.  N.J.S.A. § 32:23-70; N.Y. Unconsol. § 9870.  
Such amendments have the pre-approval of Congress.10  
Here, Count I of the Amended Complaint challenges the 
Commission’s amendment to Rule 4.4 on the basis that the 
Compact provision under which it was promulgated—
the1999 amendment to Compact Section 5-p—is not 
consistent with the purposes of the Compact, and is therefore 
invalid due to a lack of Congressional approval.  Therefore, to 
resolve this issue, we must determine whether the anti-
discrimination certification requirement of Section 5-p is a 
valid amendment which implements the purposes of the 
Compact.  The parties agree that the resolution of this issue 
turns on whether one of the purposes of the Compact was the 
elimination of racial discrimination in the hiring of 
longshoremen.  Meanwhile, Count II of the Amended 
                                              
10 Congress’ pre-approval of such amendments is certainly 
rare.  As the Supreme Court has noted:  “Congress expressly 
gave its consent to such implementing legislation not 
formally part of the compact.  This provision in the consent 
by Congress to a compact is so extraordinary as to be unique 
in the history of compacts.  Of all the instances of 
congressional approval of state compacts . . . we have found 
no other in which Congress gave its consent to implementing 
legislation.  It is instructive that this unique provision has 
occurred in connection with approval of a compact dealing 
with the prevention of crime where, because of the peculiarly 
local nature of the problem, the inference is strongest that 
local policies are not to be thwarted.”  De Veau v. Braisted, 
363 U.S. 144, 154 (1960). 
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Complaint turns on the scope of the 1999 amendment to 
Section 5-p itself; that is, whether that amendment applies to 
A-registrants.  The resolution of these questions requires us to 
interpret provisions of the Compact.  To so do, we treat the 
Compact like any other federal statute, and interpret it 
accordingly.  See Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 128 
(1987).   
 
 Appellants argue that because the Compact did not 
specifically mention racial discrimination at the time it was 
enacted, any amendment designed to ensure fair and non-
discriminatory hiring practices cannot further the Compact’s 
purposes and is, therefore, unconstitutional.  They base this 
argument on their belief that the phrase “corrupt hiring 
practices” (which they admit the Commission was formed to 
combat) does not include the purposeful exclusion of racial 
minorities.  Therefore, the Appellants conclude, the 
Commission cannot require them to certify that their hiring 
practices comply with federal and state laws dealing with 
equal opportunity.  This argument is meritless.  Like the 
District Court, we also conclude that Count I of the Amended 
Complaint fails to state a claim as matter of law because one 
of the purposes of the Compact is the elimination of racial 
discrimination in hiring.  Section 5-p’s certification 
requirement furthers this purpose and is thus, constitutional.   
 
 The stated purpose of the Compact, as set out in 
Article I, is to rid the docks of “corrupt hiring practices,” 
“depressing and degrading” labor conditions, and 
“irregularity of employment.”  N.J.S.A. § 32:23-2; see also 
Elizabeth-Newark Shipping, Inc., 164 F.3d at 180 (“The 
Compact was enacted to eliminate corrupt hiring practices on 
21 
 
the . . . waterfront.”).11  Can it seriously be argued that racial 
discrimination in hiring (or anywhere, for that matter), is not 
a corrupt practice?  We questioned counsel for the NYSA at 
oral argument on this very point and counsel conceded that 
the antidiscrimination certification requirement was “a good 
thing.”  Oral Argument Tr. at 8-9.  When pressed further, and 
mirroring the arguments raised in their brief, counsel 
maintained that racial discrimination may be a corrupt hiring 
practice, but that it was not one of the practices considered 
corrupt when the Compact was enacted in 1953.  This 
argument belies the Compact’s legislative history and we 
                                              
11 Appellant MMMCA argues that Article I of the Compact is 
“the least likely place to find the ‘purposes’ of the Compact,” 
and that “Congress did not treat ‘the purposes of the 
Compact’ as a coded reference to Article I.”  MMMCA Br. at 
37, 48.  Instead, the MMMCA maintains that Article I is 
merely a preamble or introduction for the “substantive 
provisions of the Compact.”  MMMCA Br. at 47-48.  As the 
Commission points out, however, this argument quickly 
withers when confronted with testimony offered when the 
Compact was discussed in the United States Senate in July of 
1953.  Speaking about the Compact, New Jersey Senator 
Robert C. Hendrickson, who had introduced a bill granting 
the consent of Congress to the Compact, stated that “the 
purpose of this bill can be best stated by referring to article I 
of the compact, which sets forth the findings which shook and 
rocked the American people on the occasion of their recent 
public disclosure.”  WC-ADD at 448.  In support of their 
arguments on appeal, the Appellee submitted an addendum 
containing Commission reports and extensive legislative 
history materials.  We refer to that addendum hereinafter as 
“WC-ADD.”   
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have little difficulty concluding that such a corrupt practice 
was indeed contemplated by the state legislatures and 
Congress in enacting and approving the Compact.  
  
 Racial discrimination in hiring was a concern brought 
to the attention of the state legislatures in 1953.  Testimony 
provided by Cleophus Jacobs, the secretary-treasurer of ILA 
Local 968, a predominately African-American local, revealed 
that of its 500 members, only 100 had been getting work at 
that time.  Jacobs specifically pointed to the shape-up system 
as an instrument of racial discrimination: 
 
Our opposition to the shape-up, 
therefore, is not of recent origin, 
nor are we jumping on the 
bandwagon of an outraged public 
opinion.  To the members of our 
local the shape-up had produced 
an even greater evil than that 
which the public generally has 
now come to recognize.  It has 
been the instrument of racial 
discrimination against our 
members and consequently has 
further reduced job opportunities 
for them. 
 
WC-ADD at 301.  This testimony was not the only instance 
where racial discrimination was discussed prior to the 
enactment of the Compact.  Special Counsel to the Dewey 
hearings, Theodore Kiendl, followed-up on Jacob’s 
statements by asking him: 
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Q: And you think [the shape-
up] system leads to racial 
discrimination? 
 
A: It does.  Whether crime 
might have been produced or not, 
but the system of shape-up really 
facilitates the exercise of racial 
discrimination. 
 
WC-ADD at 305.  Counsel also produced a March 1952 
edition of the “Negro Longshoreman,” a newsletter written 
and edited by the rank-and-file membership of Local 968.  
Counsel called attention to the following statement:  “We 
Negro longshoremen are discriminated against first of all by 
our own International officials of the ILA who deny us 
representation or jurisdiction over any piers on the 
waterfront.”  Id. at 306.  Finally, the record of the state 
hearings clearly demonstrates that racial discrimination was 
one of the corrupt hiring practices the Compact strove to 
eliminate.  Counsel directly asked Jacobs: 
 
Q: Now, don’t you think that 
the programs presented by  the 
State Crime Commission 
eliminate the shape-up entirely 
and substituting a new form of 
hiring is highly  desirable to 
obtain the very ends that your 
union  wants to accomplish, to 
wit, the elimination of racial 
discrimination entirely? 
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A. I agree the Commission 
has made an effort . . . 
 
Id.   
 The subsequent federal Congressional hearings on the 
Compact likewise contain discussions about the problem of 
racial discrimination in waterfront hiring practices.  During a 
1953 hearing on the Compact before the United States Senate, 
New Hampshire Senator Charles W. Tobey scathingly 
criticized ILA hiring practices of the time as racially 
discriminatory.  Senator Tobey first noted the ILA’s practice 
of charging African-American union members double the 
amount of initiation fees they charged to white members.  
WC-ADD at 445.  Then, the Senator continued his statements 
decrying the racial discrimination inflicted upon the ILA’s 
African-American members: 
 
Man’s inhumanity to man is being 
exemplified in certain labor 
circles.  Such labor unions had 
better take cover.  They are riding 
for a fall.  The time cannot come 
too soon.  Let us clean them out.  
Who is running this country 
anyway, I ask—honest, God-
fearing people, or crooked labor 
union leaders?  We can give 
names and addresses.  Cry out, 
America, “Unclean, unclean.” 
 
Id.  The “corrupt hiring practices” language used in the 
Compact embodies the concerns both the state and federal 
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legislatures had in confronting racial discrimination in hiring 
on the docks.  Given this legislative history, we easily 
conclude that the 1999 Amendment to Section 5-p reflected 
the legislatures’ belief that ending racial discrimination in 
employment was part of the Compact’s core purposes.  As 
such, it had Congressional approval.  We, therefore, agree 
with the District Court that Count I fails to state a claim.12 
 
 We also will affirm the District Court’s dismissal of 
Count II.  As we indicated earlier, the issues raised in this 
Count invoke the scope of Rule 4.4, that is, to which workers 
it applies.  Under the framework in place for hiring of A-
registrants, the ILA has the exclusive right to recruit and 
select potential employees to be referred for employment as 
A-registrants.  The Commission maintains that this practice is 
no better than the shape-up system of old.  In amending Rule 
4.4, the Commission’s purpose was to hold employers 
accountable for any racial discrimination that may have 
infected the ILA’s selection and referral of A-registrants.  Put 
another way, the amendment was an attempt by the 
Commission to ensure that the NYSA and the MMMCA’s 
hiring of A-registrants was done in a nondiscriminatory 
manner. 
 
 Appellants argue that the Rule’s certification 
requirement is improper because Section 5-p, on which it was 
                                              
12 The NYSA and the ILA argue, in a brief footnote, that the 
District Court’s dismissal of Count V should be reversed for 
the same reasons as Count I.  NYSA-ILA Br. at 45 n.10.  
They point to no other grounds for reversal of this Count.  
Inasmuch as we will affirm the dismissal of Count I, we 
likewise will affirm the dismissal of Count V. 
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based, only applies to deep-sea longshoremen, not A-
registrants.  Appellant MMMCA goes further, arguing that 
the Commission has repeatedly stated that the Section 5-p 
does not apply to maintenance and repair workers, an 
overwhelming majority of whom are A-registrants.  A look at 
the language of Section 5-p itself quickly defeats this 
argument.  Section 5-p of the Compact contains five 
subdivisions, the fourth of which states that 
“[n]otwithstanding any other provision of this act, the 
commission may include in the longshoremen’s register under 
such terms and conditions as the commission may prescribe:  
. . . [a] person defined as a ‘longshoreman’ in subdivision (6) 
of section 1(5-a) of P.L.1954, c. 14 (C.32:23-85), who is 
employed by a stevedore as defined in paragraph (b) or (c) of 
subdivision (1) of the same section (C.32:23-85) and whose 
employment is not subject to the guaranteed annual income 
provisions of any collective bargaining agreement relating to 
longshoremen.”  N.J.S.A. § 32:23-114(4).  These persons, in 
other words, are A-registrants and under the Compact, the 
Commission may include them in the register under whatever 
terms and conditions it wishes.      
     
 Appellants offer us little contrary argument, pointing 
only to an unreported ruling of the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of New York as support for 
their position.  In Bozzi, supra., two A-registrant workers had 
mistakenly been working as deep-sea longshoremen in the 
holds of general cargo vessels.  The Commission, after 
learning of this error, told the two workers to cease 
performing general longshore work, except for those jobs 
they had been approved to perform.  The A-registrants sued, 
asking for a declaratory judgment that the Commission had 
the authority under Section 5-p(5)(b) of the Compact to 
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include them in the closed deep-sea register.  The 
Commission argued that the closed register provision has 
always been interpreted to apply only to deep-sea 
longshoreman and the Commission has consistently viewed 
Section 5-p(5)(b) as a housekeeping provision, which merely 
clarifies the status of A-registrants.  The District Court, after 
an extensive discussion of Section 5-p(5)(b)’s legislative 
history, agreed with the Commission, and held that the two 
A-registrants could not individually be added to the closed 
deep-sea register.  The individual workers asked for a 
declaratory judgment that the Commission had the authority 
to include them in the closed deep-sea register.   
 
 The Appellants seize upon the Commission’s position 
in Bozzi—that the closed register provisions of Section 5-p 
only apply to deep-sea longshoremen, not A-registrants—to 
argue that the nondiscrimination certification requirements of 
Section 5-p only apply to deep-sea longshoremen.  This 
contention is baseless and misconstrues Bozzi.  While A-
registrants may not be included in the closed register 
provisions of Section 5-p, they are subject to Section 5-p’s 
other provisions, like the nondiscrimination provisions at 
issue here.  As the District Court noted, the Commission has 
been interpreting Section 5-p(5)(b) this way for decades, and 
that interpretation is entitled to great weight.  See Chevron, 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
844 (1984). 
 
 In sum, Compact Section 5p-(5)(b) clearly provides 
that A-registrants may be included in the deep-sea register 
under “such terms and conditions as the [C]ommission may 
prescribe.”   N.J.S.A. § 32:23-114(4).  The District Court did 
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not err in dismissing Count II of the Amended Complaint for 
failure to state a claim. 
 
B. 
Dismissal of Counts III, IV and VII 
 We will also affirm the District Court’s dismissal of 
Counts III, IV, and VII of the Amended Complaint.  Taken 
together, these three counts accuse the Commission of 
unlawfully interfering with the Appellants’ collective 
bargaining rights by implementing the nondiscrimination 
certification provisions.  The Appellants also maintain that 
the Commission’s actions violate national labor policy by 
dictating the terms of their collective bargaining agreements.  
We reject both contentions. 
 
 We take these claims out of numerical order, and start 
our discussion with Count VII.  The District Court dismissed 
Count VII for an inadequacy in pleading under Fed. R. Civ. P. 
8(a), and we review such a ruling for an abuse of discretion.  
In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 696, 702 (3d Cir. 
1996).  We see no abuse of the District Court’s discretion in 
its dismissal of this count.  At the outset, the NYSA and ILA 
acknowledge this count’s lack of a specific demand for relief.  
NYSA-ILA Br. at 61.  This omission, in and of itself, justifies 
a dismissal of the count.  See Simmons v. Abruzzo, 49 F.3d 
83, 86 (2d Cir. 1995).  Further, we share the District Court’s 
conclusion that Count VII is little more than a collection of 
conclusory statements and a recitation of Commission 
Determination 35.  Given this, the District Court’s conclusion 
that the Appellants failed to connect their allegations to a 
violation of Compact Article XV was not unreasonable and 
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therefore, its decision to dismiss this count for a failure to 
adequately allege facts sufficient to state a claim for relief 
was not an abuse of its discretion. 
 
 Turning now to Counts III and IV, we note that the 
Appellants argue, with more specificity, that the 
Commission’s actions violate Article XV of the Compact, 
which states, among other things, that: 
 
This compact [was] not designed . 
. . to limit in any way any rights 
granted or derived from any other 
statute or any rule of law for 
employees to organize in labor 
organizations, to bargain 
collectively and to act in any other 
way individually, collectively, 
and though labor organizations or 
other representatives of their own 
choosing. 
 
**** 
 
This compact is not designed and 
shall not be construed to limit in 
any way rights of longshoremen, 
hiring agents, pier superintendents 
or port watchmen or their 
employers to bargain collectively 
. . .. 
 
N.J.S.A. § 32:23-68, -69.  Appellants argue that this Article 
guarantees them “unfettered collective bargaining” and gives 
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them “freedom of choice in the selection of employees.”  
NYSA-ILA Br. at 9-10.  This position is untenable, however, 
because the language of Article XV is not absolute.  Indeed, 
in this very context, we have held that collective bargaining 
rights cannot supersede “the Commission’s supervisory role 
regarding practices that might lead to corruption.”  Sea Land,  
764 F.2d at 966-67.  That is, Article XV “guarantees that 
[collectively bargained] hiring procedures will not be 
displaced where they comport with the Compact.”  Id. at 963.  
Obviously, the converse is true as well: where actions are not 
in furtherance of the original purposes of the Compact, 
collective bargaining rights may be infringed upon. 
 
 Here, as we previously determined, the eradication of 
racial discrimination in hiring was one of the original 
purposes of the Compact.  The Commission’s actions in 
requiring certification that prospective employees were 
selected in a nondiscriminatory manner certainly further the 
Compact’s purposes of rooting out corrupt hiring practices 
such as racial discrimination.  Therefore, the Commission’s 
certification regulation cannot be viewed as an improper 
intrusion into Appellants’ collective bargaining rights. 
 
 Appellant MMMCA takes a slightly different tact on 
this issue, arguing that the Commission cannot undertake any 
action that would limit the ability of labor and management to 
agree to a mutually satisfactory way of selecting employees.  
The MMMCA maintains that “the Compact treats as 
inviolable whatever method the bargaining parties arrive at.”  
MMMCA Br. at 56.  While the Compact does safeguard the 
Appellants’ collective bargaining rights, it does so only to the 
extent those rights do not conflict with the purposes of the 
Compact.  We held as much in Sea Land, supra.  There, in 
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order to resolve a conflict between a Commission regulation 
and an existing CBA, we proposed a modification, noting that 
this change “maintains both the Commission’s supervisory 
role regarding practices that might lead to corruption and the 
union’s collectively-bargained hiring procedures.”  764 F.2d 
at 966-67.  We reject, therefore, the argument that 
Appellants’ collective bargaining rights are absolute and will 
affirm the District Court’s dismissal of these counts.  
 
C.   
Due Process Issues 
 Appellants’ last issue will not detain us long.  The 
Appellants contend that their due process rights were violated 
because the Commission did not conduct public hearings 
before implementing the nondiscrimination amendment.  This 
argument does not hold up under scrutiny because the 
Commission’s actions were legislative and procedural due 
process does not extend to legislative action.  See Rogin v. 
Bensalem Twp., 616 F.2d 680, 693 (3d Cir. 1980) (citing Bi-
Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization of Colo., 239 
U.S. 441 (1915); see also Acierno v. Cloutier, 40 F.3d 597, 
610 (3d Cir. 1994) (en banc)).   
 
 First, and contrary to their own argument, the 
Appellants note that the Amended Complaint alleged that the 
nondiscrimination amendment was “enacted,” which 
connotes legislative action.  Second, the Amended Complaint 
fails to allege that the Commission acted in some way that 
was contrary to statutory procedures.  Indeed, amending the 
Commission’s own rules is legislative action. 
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 More importantly, the Commission gave the NYSA-
ILA ample notice and opportunity vis-à-vis the 
nondiscrimination amendment.  The Appellants were notified 
of the proposed amendments and indeed, submitted 
comments in opposition during the pertinent time period.  We 
see no procedural due process violation here simply because 
the Commission did not hold a public hearing before 
amending its own rules.  Neither did the District Court and 
we will affirm that determination. 
 
V. 
 Like the District Court, we conclude that the Amended 
Complaint fails to state any claim upon which relief may be 
granted.  Therefore, we see no error in the District Court’s 
dismissal. 
